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Abstract 
Electricity generation from renewables in Germany has now reached a relevant magnitude for the energy sector. 
The further increase of electricity from renewable energy sources is driven by the Energy Concept enacted by the 
Federal Government in 2010 with the goal of transforming the energy system into a renewable based one by 
2050 [BMU and BMWi 2011]. In order to achieve the political targets reorganisation in terms of technical, 
institutional and financial aspects is needed. The transformation and structural adjustments are characterised by a 
huge variety of actors, who are connected through complex interactions with one another and who react very 
differently to changes in the settings of the energy sector. 
We will present the agent-based simulation model AMIRIS (Agent-based Model for the Integration of 
Renewables Into the Power System), which can be used as a policy analysis and design tool to foster the 
integration of renewable energy sources into the electricity market. Additionally, we show some results of first 
simulation runs for the assessment of the ‘optional market premium’ in Germany until 20201. 
 
Keywords: Market Integration, Renewable Energy, Agent-based Modelling, Policy Framework, Market 
Premium. 
Introduction and Overview 
There is a demand for changing the energy supply systems to more sustainable ones all around the world. The 
need for change is economically driven by the increasing long-term costs of fossil fuels caused by their 
decreasing availability; ecologically driven by the risks of climate change, and also technologically driven to 
gain progress in efficiency of low-risk energy systems with renewable resources. Increasing the share of 
renewable energies is seen as one pillar of this transition. 
With the expansion of renewable energy sources (RES) for electricity generation according to the political 
targets of the German government [BMU and BMWi 2011] organizational, technical and financial aspects of the 
electricity system need to be redesigned. In order to create well-defined and reliable political guidelines and 
frameworks for the necessary adjustment, it is essential to understand the actors’ patterns and options for action 
related to the discussed policy framework as well as the impact of their behaviour on the overall system. For the 
analysis of such complex and multiple linked systems with autonomous actors agent-based modelling (ABM) - 
originating from the research field of artificial intelligence - is particularly suitable [Troitzsch 2009]. 
By applying the ABM approach to the issue of market integration and direct marketing of renewable energy a 
model based methodology for the assessment of support schemes is developed. This allows for taking the 
stakeholders’ decision rules into account as well as their behavioural adaptations (e. g. new business models) in 
consequence of changes of the policy environment. The AMIRIS Model enables the analysis of macroeconomic 
effects (system level) as well as microeconomic effects (actors level) in regard to policy modifications. 
In the second part of this paper (Policy Framework) we describe the development of the energy economic 
regulation and the Renewable Energy Source Act (EEG) in Germany in the past years as well as the current 
revision of the EEG 2012 with focus on their objective of fostering the market integration of RES. 
An important prerequisite for the set-up of the agent-based simulation model was the thorough analysis of the 
relevant actors. Therefore, a short description of the actor analysis is given in part three (Actor Analysis), 
followed by a short introduction to agent-based modelling and its application to energy markets in part four 
(Agent-based Modelling). The presentation of the AMIRIS model is conducted in chapter five (The AMIRIS 
Model), showing how the results of the policy and actor analysis were translated into a formalised model 
language. Finally, having in mind that the model is still under development we will present some first results of 
basic simulation runs analysing the effects of the introduction of the ‘optional market premium’ on the involved 
actors in Germany until 2020 (Results) before summing up the paper in the conclusion section. 
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Policy Framework: From Market Introduction to Market Integration 
Since the liberalisation of the energy markets in Germany in 1998 the coordination of system relevant aspects 
like the power plant dispatch, the offer of balance energy as well as the supply of the electricity is organised over 
markets in which a lot of different actors are involved. To ensure a reliable system, the supply and demand of 
energy has to be balanced at all times. However in the future, energy systems and markets will have to deal with 
higher shares of intermittent renewable resources like solar power and wind aligned by the insecurity of their 
availability causing higher volatility and unpredictability in the energy markets. Though, biomass, water and 
geothermal energy (dispatchable RES) as well as energy storage, grid extension and demand side management 
can contribute to the balance of the system. Given that the focus of this study is on the market integration of RES 
the last three options are excluded from this study. 
The most important instrument to support RES in the past was the EEG. For the market introduction mainly 
dealing with fixed feed-in tariffs (FIT) and guaranteed buy-offs for electricity produced by RES through the 
Transmission System Operators (TSO). This act was embedded in a process of liberalisation aimed to open the 
energy markets from a more or less “closed shop” of some big companies to a widespread open market, 
including an energy exchange, new suppliers and also a great variety of technologies. The EEG, released in 
2000
2
, was revised several times in between (i.e. in 2004 and 2009) before relevant changes and reforms were 
made in 2012 to support the direct marketing approach, parallel to the FIT system. The argument was that 
increasing shares of RES (dispatchable and intermittent) call for a more demand oriented feed-in in order to 
better fit the liberalisation concept and stabilise the grid. With direct marketing it was assumed that several 
drawbacks of RES - especially of the intermittent ones like poor predictability and storability - would improve 
with private investments and innovations. 
Therefore, our analysis focuses on the current energy-economic changes from the revised EEG 2012. Since 2012 
direct marketing is flanked by a new support mechanism called ‘optional market premium’. It enables to transfer 
the duties of selling the renewable energy from the TSO to renewable power plant operator (PPO) or 
intermediaries respectively. One focus of the investigation is on the development of new business models, 
innovative direct marketing strategies and new forms of cooperation between actors under the “old” EEG 2009 
and the new regulation mechanisms like the ‘optional market premium’ (§ 33g EEG), the ‘flexibility premium 
for biogas plants’ (§ 33i EEG) and the modified ‘green electricity privilege’ (§ 39 EEG) [EEG 2012]. 
First ideas and attempts by RES PPOs to switch from the FIT system into direct marketing were already made in 
the years between 2006 and 2008. At this time wholesale electricity prices at the energy exchange were starting 
to rise - at least in a couple of hours of the year - to a level above the lowest FIT of wind. After the economic 
crisis in 2008 wholesale power prices fell from an annual average of 65,78 €/MWh in 2008 to 38,86 €/MWh in 
2009
3
 putting an abrupt ending to the first direct marketing efforts. 
Although direct marketing of RES using the so-called ‘green electricity privilege’ was possible since the 
beginning of the EEG in the year 2000, the term ‘direct marketing’ and its corresponding paragraph was not 
explicitly mentioned until the EEG amendment of the year 2009 (§ 17 EEG) - mainly regulating the time periods 
for deciding to opt for direct marketing and re-entry into the FIT system as well as notification duties to the TSO. 
As recently as the EEG 2012, direct marketing of RES is specifically promoted by law through the ‘optional 
market premium’ and the ‘flexibility premium for biogas plants’. 
Actor Analysis 
In order to set-up the agent-based simulation model an actor analysis of the relevant actors was conducted. At its 
starting point the analysis took assumptions derived from the sociological theory of strategic action fields, as 
well as concepts from neo-institutionalism of organisational sociology. The theory of strategic action fields 
[Fligstein/McAdam 2011] offers a specific viewpoint by interpreting activities related to direct marketing as the 
attempt of competing actors to shape and design a specific field of action as a new market. Such a new, emergent 
field typically consists of three types of actors: incumbent actors, challengers, and governance units. In order to 
understand the competing interests and identities of the respective actors, it could be referred to 
neo-institutionalist organisational theories. Seen from this perspective, formal institutions, actors, and routines 
are mutually constitutive and influence each other. In order to understand the behaviour of economic actors, 
sociological concepts have developed alternative approaches to the typical neo-classical understanding of actors 
as the ‘homo economicus’. Typically economic actors’ behaviour is efficiency-oriented, but is nevertheless also 
led by external expectations and sometimes non-economic requests, and is thus shaped by dominant institutions 
in the specific organisational field [Scott 1995]. For this reason, different actors from differing backgrounds and 
environments develop different strategies with regard to their goals, as well as with regard to those strategies and 
measures required to reach their specific goals. For example the actions of new firms with close links to the 
environmental scene differ from large utility companies traditionally used to centralised structures. 
                                                          
2 The forerunner of the EEG, the “Stromeinspeisegesetz” was already introduced in 1990. 
3 Own calculations derived from market data purchased from the European Energy Exchange www.eex.com.  
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Those general theory-led assumptions and propositions were substantiated according to the objectives, strategies 
and interaction patterns of the different actors in the new action field of direct marketing. Then they were 
developed further on the back of document analysis and expert interviews. The assumptions were then tested and 
reassessed in interviews with representatives from the most important actor-groups, as well as in the context of 
an actor workshop. 
The actor analysis was complemented by further research data relating to trends, forecasts, and price 
developments. Furthermore assumptions on technological developments according to efficiency or the relevance 
of new energy technologies were taken into consideration. Finally propositions were formulated on how different 
actors would react to the new regulatory framework, which actors would profit from the new regulatory 
incentives, and which would be negatively affected. 
In a last step all these results were translated into a formalised model language in order to be integrated into the 
simulation model AMIRIS. For a detailed description of the actor analysis the reader is referred to the paper of 
Wassermann et al. of the 12
th
 IAEE proceedings. 
Agent-based Modelling and Simulation 
For the investigation of complex network systems the approach of multi-agent modelling and simulation is 
frequently used. In such economic systems the system as a whole follows an evolutionary path. In this it differs 
significantly from the usual assumption of the omniscient, utility-maximizing individuals of neoclassical 
economics that result in a series of general equilibriums [Arthur 2005]. The system behaviour in agent modelling 
results from the behaviour of individual agents - called actors in the real world - and is not centrally determined 
and controlled. 
The agents are situated in and influenced by a dynamic environment, which is simultaneously shaped through the 
actions of the agents - thus creating a complex structure with feedback loops. These heterogeneous agents are 
modelled having individual states, actions and goals. By implementing tactics and strategies it is also possible to 
model long-term action strategies. Agents can further be set up having the ability to communicate and cooperate 
with each other [Woodridge 2002], [Schmidt 2000]. In addition, the agents can be implemented with learning 
algorithms [Brenner 2006]. This enables them to improve over the course of simulation by gaining knowledge 
and, therefore, changing their basis of decision-making. 
Agent-based approaches to analyse market mechanisms are getting more and more popular in economics. But 
existing agent-based models of the energy sector either focus on the market mechanisms of conventional power 
systems and electricity markets [Bagnall/Smith 2005], [Grozey et al. 2006], on certain aspects of the market 
design of the wholesale market [Bunn/Oliveira 2003], [Genoese 2011], [Weidlich/Veit 2006], on the evaluation 
of specific bidding strategies and decision rules [Li/Shi 2012], [Trigo/Marques/Coelho 2009], [Melzian 2008], or 
- when dealing with RES - only on market processes, i.e. the influence of the increasing share of renewables on 
the market price [Sensfuß 2008]. So far no one has tried to set up an agent-based simulation model in order to 
analyse the policy framework of energy markets and its effect on the actors involved in the process of market 
integration of RES. 
The AMIRIS Model 
The AMIRIS Modell has hitherto been developed in two consecutive projects from 2008-2012. The first project 
was designed to generally examine the feasibility of transferring the approach of agent-based modelling to issues 
of market integration of RES under different policy and regulatory frameworks focusing on wind energy. After 
having successfully demonstrated the methodology's feasibility [Krewitt et al. 2011] the model has been 
advanced. On the one hand photovoltaic and biomass plant operators have been added. On the other hand the 
implementation of landfill and sewage gas and EEG-supported hydropower plants was waived considering their 
relative negligible energy economic relevance in Germany. 
Another important new feature exists through the employment of a stylised merit-order model of the 
conventional power plants. This allows the calculation of a model-endogenetic stock market price. Hence, direct 
effects on the wholesale price resulting from an increased supply of renewable electricity are considered. 
Figure 1 shows the current model structure. The RES PPOs (see The Power Plant Operators Agents) can either 
sell electricity directly to the TSO ("passive" RES-PPO) receiving their remuneration through the FIT, or sign a 
contract and mandate one of the intermediaries to market the electricity directly ("active" RES PPO). Physically, 
the electricity generally flows via the TSO to the supplier, which symbolises the electricity demand and serves as 
the sink of the system. The demand side is not explicitly modelled yet, but is represented by standard load 
profiles. The RES PPO can be operated in combination with a local storage operator, which can be parameterised 
in order to represent different technical storage possibilities. As ‘storage and RES combined power plants’ are 
not in focus of this investigation, the storage operators are switched off. Instead the most differentiated agents 
are the intermediaries, representing either a completely new actor type or at least an actor who is setting up a 
new business in this field. Focusing on direct marketing they can concentrate on a certain marketing strategy (see 
The Intermediary Agents). When selling the electricity to the energy exchange or the supplier they are 
responsible for meeting the profile that was fixed days or weeks ahead. Since especially intermittent RES are 
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hard to predict correctly, the intermediaries might need balance energy (see The Intermediary Agents). With the 
predicted RES feed-in of 24h ahead the residual load is calculated by the energy exchange, before balancing the 
demand with the supply in order to determine the wholesale stock market price according to the merit order of 
the conventional generation system. 
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Figure 1: AMIRIS Model Structure (Agent-based Model for the Integration of Renewables Into the Power  
System) 
The Power Plant Operators Agents 
So far we model the feed-in of wind, PV and biomass (divided into solid biomass and biogas) power plants, 
which represent in total 93.4 % of the EEG-promoted electricity generation and 80 % of the whole RES 
generation in Germany by the end of 2010. For reasons of manageability the plants are summarised into four 
classes for each RES as a function of their FIT-level and technological suitability for direct marketing. Reference 
calculations for the year 2008 show that we cover 97.7 % of real EEG-remunerations for wind, 95 % for PV and 
87 % for biomass with this methodology. 
Table 1 shows the four defined wind classes and their development in terms of installed capacity and height of 
the mean FIT-remuneration level. Class 1 characterises wind turbines of the ‘basic remuneration’ level, class 2 
and 3 turbines of the ‘increased starting remuneration’ level and class 4 off-shore wind turbines. 
Classes 
Year 
1    
[MW] 
2    
[MW] 
3    
[MW] 
4    
[MW] Sum 1-3 
1 
[€/MWh] 
2 
[€/MWh] 
3 
[€/MWh] 
4 
[€/MWh] 
2012 1978 12025 15894 242 29897 61,9 84,8 90,9 190,0 
2013 2703 12778 15603 625 31085 61,9 84,9 90,9 190,0 
2014 4119 13355 14900 1925 32374 61,9 85,0 91,0 190,0 
2015 5491 13770 14204 3325 33466 61,9 85,0 90,9 190,0 
2016 7647 14046 12649 4825 34341 61,9 85,0 90,8 190,0 
2017 10459 15290 9409 6325 35158 61,6 85,2 91,1 190,0 
2018 12570 13769 9409 15000 35747 61,3 84,7 91,1 186,2 
2019 13813 12373 9409 30000 35595 60,3 84,4 91,1 180,4 
2020 14053 11244 9409 40000 34706 59,3 84,2 91,1 173,9 
Table 1: Development of installed capacity and FIT height for wind PPOs. 
The development in terms of installed capacity and height of the mean FIT-remuneration level for PV is 
displayed in table 2. Class 1 represents PV plants on rooftops < 30 kW, class 2 rooftop PV between 30-1000 kW, 
class 3 rooftop PV > 1000 kW and class 4 PV on conversion areas and free space. 
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Classes 
Year 
1    
[MW] 
2    
[MW] 
3    
[MW] 
4    
[MW] Sum 1-4 
1 
[€/MWh] 
2 
[€/MWh] 
3 
[€/MWh] 
4 
[€/MWh] 
2012 14266 8923 348 3444 26981 305,4 333,8 253,7 253,0 
2013 16016 10113 418 3934 30481 283,8 311,7 234,4 236,0 
2014 17716 11269 486 4410 33881 266,4 293,0 218,8 221,7 
2015 19366 12391 552 4872 37181 251,4 276,8 205,7 209,4 
2016 20968 13480 616 5320 40384 238,4 262,7 194,3 198,6 
2017 22566 14567 680 5768 43581 226,6 249,8 184,1 188,8 
2018 24164 15653 744 6215 46777 215,9 238,0 174,8 179,8 
2019 25767 16744 808 6664 49983 206,0 227,1 166,3 171,5 
2020 27372 17835 872 7113 53192 196,9 217,1 158,4 163,8 
Table 2: Development of installed capacity and FIT height for PV PPOs. 
Table 3 illustrates the defined biomass classes. Class 1 signifies biomass co-generation power plants between 5-
20 MW fed with old wood and forest residues; class 2 innovative technologies (e.g. wood gasification); class 3 
biogas power plants between 50-1000 kW fed with liquid manure and renewable crop materials, class 4 biogas 
plants > 5 MW fed with bio-waste. 
Classes 
Year 
1    
[MW] 
2     
[MW] 
3     
[MW] 
4    
[MW] Sum 1-4 
1 
[€/MWh] 
2 
[€/MWh] 
3 
[€/MWh] 
4 
[€/MWh] 
2012 2172 91 2522 25 4810 97,0 164,1 175,6 142,3 
2013 2289 192 2643 53 5177 97,3 171,5 176,9 140,8 
2014 2397 341 2724 84 5547 97,6 173,4 177,5 139,3 
2015 2499 538 2791 119 5947 97,7 173,5 178,0 137,7 
2016 2591 790 2845 156 6382 97,7 172,9 178,3 136,2 
2017 2675 1090 2899 197 6861 97,7 171,9 178,5 134,6 
2018 2749 1447 2953 241 7389 97,7 170,7 178,6 133,0 
2019 2816 1862 3007 288 7973 97,6 169,5 178,7 131,5 
2020 2880 2334 3048 338 8599 97,5 168,2 178,8 129,9 
Table 3: Development of installed capacity and FIT height for biomass PPOs. 
For wind and PV we use historical feed-in data of the four TSOs for the years 2006 till 2012. From 2012 
onwards, feed-in is calculated by multiplying the installed capacity of each class with the time series of a typical 
meteorological year calculated with the REMix Modell [Scholz 2011]. The development of the installed capacity 
is derived from the ‘RES long-term scenarios 2011’ of the Federal Ministry for the Environment, Nature 
Conversation and Nuclear Safety [Nitsch et al. 2012]. Only for off-shore wind capacity in the years 2011-2016 
data from the 'mid-term prognosis' of the four TSOs is used [IE Leipzig 2011], as data from the ‘RES long-term 
scenarios’ for this technology is not appropriate in the short term. Given that these studies state the development 
of RES capacity in an annual resolution we linearly interpolated the capacity deployment to get values for each 
hour of the year till 2020. The development of the FITs and their degression in the future orientate on the revised 
EEG 2012. 
So far the FIT is compensating for each kilowatt-hour (kWh) of produced electricity. Hence - although 
dispatchable - biomass and biogas PPOs were trying to produce as much electricity as possible by operating at 
full load throughout the whole day and year. Besides the ‘optional market premium’ the EEG 2012 introduced 
the ‘flexibility premium for biogas plants’ in order to actuate a more demand orientated operating strategy. The 
flexibility premium was designed to compensate for a portion of the necessary investments, e.g. for gas storage 
and additional generation capacity. But still, some of the investments need to be amortised by higher marketing 
values resulting from a more flexible feed-in of electricity at times of higher demand. Although the investment 
calculation is not yet implemented, we included a day-night-cycle operating strategy for those solid biomass and 
biogas PPOs who decide in favour of direct marketing. In this mode the plants run with half capacity during 
night-time (6 p.m. – 6 a.m.) and with one and a half capacity during daytime (6 a.m. – 6 p.m.) - and therefore 
profiting from higher and lower spot market prices. 
The Intermediary Agents 
For the set-up of AMIRIS the actor analysis originated ten different prototyped intermediary-agents which are 
distinguished in their marketing strategy and time of market entry, the tariffs they offer to the PPOs, their capital 
background, forecasting quality and search costs for gaining new PPOs as business partners (Wassermann et 
al.2012). In the model each intermediary can focus on one or two of five direct marketing strategies for the 
contracted electricity: 
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1. Selling via the TSO receiving the FIT. 
2. Marketing via the energy exchange being paid the ‘optional market premium’. 
3. Trading via a supplier by using the ‘green electricity privilege’. 
4. Regional or local marketing through a direct-power-line to the end-consumer. 
5. Offering power plant capacity on the minute reserve market. 
 
For reasons of current political discussions the focus of the first simulation runs was on the marketing strategy 
via the market premium. Hereafter the model and also the intermediary-agents were fitted to the characteristics 
shown in Table 4. 
When signing a contract with a PPO, the intermediary takes over all obligations of the electricity marketing. In 
return he receives the ‘market premium’ from the TSO and pays the PPO in addition to the FIT-remuneration a 
bonus of ‘X’. The ‘market premium’ consists of a ‘variable premium’ to balance the difference between the FIT 
and the market value of the RES and a ‘management premium’ for clearing further marketing cost [EEG 2012]. 
 
Prototype Capital resources 
(million €) 
Market 
premium 
Tariff Forecast quality 
(1) Big national utility 100 2012 FIT+X Good 
(2) International utility 15 2012 FIT+X Good 
(3) Big municipal utility 15 2012 FIT+X Medium 
(4) Municipal utility “Pioneer” 15 2012 FIT+X Good 
(5) Small municipal utility 7 2012 FIT+X Bad 
(6) 
Green electricity trader for 
households 
7 2012 FIT+X Good 
(7) 
Green electricity trader for 
business/industry 
7 2012 FIT+X Good 
(8) 
Green electricity trader for local 
marketing 
1 - FIT+X Medium 
(9) 
Functional intermediary as spin-off 
from a big utility 
3 2012 FIT+X Good 
(10) Functional intermediary as start-up 0,1 2012 FIT+X Medium 
Table 4: Subtype intermediaries and their characteristics. 
According to the EEG, additional costs which arise independently from the traded electricity (fixed costs) like 
office rent, labour costs, access to the European Energy Exchange (EEX) platform as well as IT- and office 
equipment are supposed to be remunerated by the ‘trading component’ of the ‘management premium’. The 
expenses which are directly linked to the traded electricity (variable costs) like the EEX trading fees, forecasting 
costs and expenses for balancing energy are intended to be rewarded through the ‘profile service component’ of 
the ‘management premium’. Due to the assumption that the intermediaries improve actions and routines over 
time, the management premium decreases from 12 €/MWh in 2012 to 7 €/MWh in 2015 for wind and PV PPOs 
and from 3 €/MWh to 2.25 €/MWh for dispatchable plants like biomass or water [Sensfuß/Ragwitz 2011], which 
forces the intermediaries to adjust their tariffs over time. With the help of the results of the actor analysis, 
additional expert-interviews as well as analysis of public available data, we reproduced the business cost 
structure of the intermediaries as shown in Table 5. 
 Fix costs    Variable costs    
1. Office rent 133 €/a*m² 1. EEX Trading fee 0,0075 €/MWh  
2. Office space factor:   3. Specific labour costs (staff) 0,052 €/MWh  
 
Number of 
employees (E) 
< 5 42 m²/E  
Supervised volume / 
employee 
1.250.000 MWh/E  
    5 - 10 36 m²/E      
  10 - 20 35 m²/E 4. Forecasting costs:  €/MW  
  20 - 50 26 m²/E  Small portfolio 500-1500 MW --> €/MW: 15 
  > 50 25 m²/E  Medium portfolio 1500-3000 MW --> €/MW: 10 
3. EEX access 25.000 €/a  Big portfolio 3000-5000 MW --> €/MW: 5 
4. IT-/ Office equipment 10.000 €/a*E 5. Forecasting quality:    
5. Labour costs:    Good Number of purchased forecasts: 3 
  Trader 130.000 €/a*E  Medium Number of purchased forecasts: 2 
  Other staff 65.000 €/a*E  Bad Number of purchased forecasts: 1 
Table 5: Business cost structure of intermediary-agents in AMIRIS. 
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The resulting economies of scale can be 
clearly identified in Figure 2. For the 
adjustment of the tariffs we assume that 
at the beginning of each year half of the 
amount of the ‘management premium’ 
is paid as a bonus to the PPO. 
Additionally, according to the 
performance of the past business year 
the agent can adjust his tariff. At the 
end of each year the agents carry out a 
balance check by calculating their 
profit-turnover ratio and EBIT
4
 per 
employee. Being subject to these two 
success figures the bonus might be 
increased or decreased. For instance, if 
the EBIT per employee lies between 
€ 100,000-300,000 the bonus remains 
the same. If the value of the success 
figure is between € 300,000-500,000 the bonus is raised by 25 %, if it exceeds € 500,000 the bonus is risen by 
50 %. Counter wise if the EBIT per employee stays between € 50,000-100,000 the bonus is lowered by 25 % and 
below € 50,000 by 50 %. 
Apart from economies of scale there is another financial advantage for bigger players. The larger and more 
spatially diverse the managed portfolio of intermittent RES, the smaller is the forecast error in total. This is due 
to the so-called smoothing effect [Marrone et al. 2008]. Again we used results of the actor analysis and hence set 
the forecasting errors to 15 % of the produced electricity for good, 20 % for medium and 25 % for bad 
prognoses. With each GW of wind or PV added to the portfolio the forecasting error reduces by 1 % or is lifted 
by 1 % if the portfolio shrinks. 
The absolute feed-in error is calculated by a normally distributed random draw according to the forecasting 
quality and portfolio size of the intermediary and added to the perfect foresight feed-in laying 24 h ahead. The 
resulting feed-in schedule is then reported to the EEX and TSO. At the time of physical production, the hourly 
forecasted feed-in is compared to the real-time feed in of each hour. The caused balance energy amount is 
multiplied by an evenly distributed random draw of the historical balance energy prices of the year 2011
5
. Due to 
the hourly simulation schedule, the random draw of the balance energy prices is executed in an hourly resolution 
as well. Depending on having intensified or debilitated the net total of the accounting grid of the TSO-area, the 
intermediary disburses or receives balancing payments. So far the intermediary is not yet trading on the real-time 
markets to balance the forecast errors. 
Model Parameterisation 
As stated in the Agent-based Modelling section we apply the approach of agent-based modelling and simulation 
to analyse self-evolving and emergent systems, respectively. In order to analyse the consequences of introducing 
the ‘optional market premium’ on the involved actors we need to relate two simulation runs: a ‘FIT system run’ 
and a ‘market premium run’.  
Since the model is still under development, the simulation runs so far are static. In this case static means that a) 
the intermediaries are not entering into competition and b) the PPOs are not able to switch contracts between the 
intermediaries if better tariff offers arise and c) the stochastic variables in the model are drawn with the same 
random seeds. Otherwise the results would not be comparable. Thus, the model is parameterised in the two 
following ways for the runs from the year 2012 till 2020: 
 
FIT system run 
This run simulates the hypothetical case in which everything stays the way it would be without introducing direct 
marketing support through the optional market premium in 2012. Hence all PPOs stay in the FIT system - no 
intermediaries are entering the market. The installed RES capacities and the height of the FIT develop as shown 
in tables 1, 2 and 3. 
 
Market premium run 
This run simulates the case in which the market premium is introduced in January 2012. For the static analysis 
some of the parameters need to be set external. This means the parameters can change over the course of 
                                                          
4 EBIT = Earnings before interests and taxes. 
5 As of the difficulties to forecast the development of balance energy prices, in addition to the 2011 balance energy prices two 
more basic histograms for balance energy prices can be employed: a) Having the distance to the uniform distribution in 2011 
and b) reduction of the distance to the uniform distribution by a quarter.  
Figure 2: Business cost of intermediary-agents in AMIRIS. 
8 
 
simulation by adjusting the external data, but they do not change because of model endogenetic developments - 
as it would be necessary for a real emergent system. This applies for the following initial parameters: 
 Share of RES in direct marketing by each intermediary as shown in table 66. 
 Share of biomass plants able to operate in flexible day-night mode. 
 
Prototype 
Wind    
(onshore) 
Wind (offshore) PV 
Biomass 
solid biogas 
(1) Big national utility 5 % 35 % - 20 % 30 % 
(2) International utility 40 % - - 35 % - 
(3) Big municipal utility 1 % - 0 % 5 % 5 % 
(4) Municipal utility “Pioneer” 10 % - 0 % 0 % 5 % 
(5) Small municipal utility 1 % 55 % - - - 
(6) 
Green electricity trader for 
households 
1 % - 0 % 0 % - 
(7) 
Green electricity trader for 
business/industry 
2 % - 0 % 15 % 50 % 
(8) 
Green electricity trader for 
local marketing 
- - - - - 
(9) 
Functional intermediary as 
start-up  
10 % 10 % 0 % 0 % - 
(10) 
Functional intermediary as 
spin-off from a big utility  
30 % - 100 % 25 % 10 % 
 
Total initial capacity in 
direct marketing 
12.050 MW 48 MW 58 MW 933 MW 
 
Total share of installed 
capacity in direct marketing 
40 % 24 % 1 % 19 % 
Table 6: Share of direct marketed capacity for each intermediary in January 2012. 
For the total initial capacity we referred to the published data of the TSOs in January
7
. The initial share of the 
intermediaries is derived from the actor analysis and public available data of different companies of the direct 
marketing business. 
To display the progress of the direct marketed capacity a linear fitting mechanism was implemented and is 
executed each month. We assume an increase of direct marketed capacity for wind onshore for all three classes 
from 40 % to 90 % and for wind offshore from 24 % to 100 % until the year 2015. For reasons of unsuitability 
for direct marketing we further figured that PV of class 1 will not opt for direct marketing at all. Thus an 
increase of direct marketed capacity for PV in class 2 up to 80 % and in class 3 and 4 up to 90 % results in an 
overall increase of installed capacity from 1 % to 40 % in the year 2015. As the biomass plants of class 2 
(‘innovative technologies’) are still in the development phase, none of them decides in favour for direct 
marketing. Therefore a total increase of installed capacity from 19 % to 75 % until the year 2015 equals an 
increase to 90 % in class 1 and 76 % in class 3 and 4. 
The share of flexible biomass plants can also be increased linearly over time. It should be reminded that we 
assume that only power plants in direct marketing are willing to invest in the necessary equipment in order to 
switch to the day-night-cycle mode. Therefore, we estimate for biomass class 1 that 10 % are initially flexible, 
rising up to 50 % in 2015. As no plant of class 2 opts for direct marketing, no share is operated flexible. In class 
3 originally no plant is flexible, but the portion increases to 50 % in 2015. Given that the support for biomass 
plants of class 4 was introduced for the first time in January 2012 through the EEG amendment, we estimate that 
all new plants are set flexible from the beginning. 
Results 
A couple of months after the introduction of the ‘optional market premium’ there are many voices saying that the 
market premium and especially the management premium only cause windfall profits for many actors without 
really endorsing the integration of the renewable energies into the energy market. In the model no explicit 
investments in order to enable a more demand oriented feed-in for the intermittent RES are being carried out by 
the PPOs. Nevertheless, we can analyse the economic effects on the involved actors to get a hint if necessary 
investments e.g. in storage could be enacted or if even further windfall profits are to be expected. 
For reasons of reading convenience of the figures, Table 7 shows the corresponding years to the hours of 
simulation. 
                                                          
6 A dash in the table means that the intermediary is not active in the according technology segment. 
7 The TSOs publish data to direct marketing online: www.eeg-kwk.net.    
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Beginning 
of Year 
2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 
hour 0 8760 17520 26280 35040 43800 52560 61320 70080 
Table 7: Simulation time table 
To better evaluate the results in the context of price developments Table 8 displays the mean average wholesale 
power prices executed in the simulations runs. As the flexible biomass power plants of the ‘market premium run’ 
indeed influence the market price the power prices are slightly different. 
Mean average power price [€/MWh] 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 
FIT-system run 51.14 50.68 51.81 53.44 55.16 56.57 57.03 58.71 
Market premium run 51.23 50.77 51.84 53.39 55.13 56.14 56.95 58.92 
Table 8: Mean average of wholesale power prices of simulation runs. 
Impact on power plant operators 
As no direct marketing takes place in the ‘FIT system run’ we can analyse in a first step the generated incomes 
of the PPOs compared to the ‘market premium run’. Figure 3 shows on the left side the cumulative revenues of 
the wind PPOs in the ‘FIT-system run’. The curves show the expected characteristics. Wind PPOs of class 2 and 
3 earn more or less linearly increasing up to the year 2020 € 18 bn., although incomes of class 2 are exceeding 
the incomes of class 3 by the middle of the year 2018. This can be explained by the change of installed capacity 
in these classes, which is increasing in class 2 and decreasing in class 3 (see also table 1). The reason for the 
convex increase of incomes in class 1 can be elucidated as follows: As time passes more and more wind turbines 
of the ‘increased starting remuneration’ classes (class 2 and 3) are falling into the lower ‘basic remuneration’ 
level (class 1) – therefore, the installed capacity of class 1 is rising over-proportionately. The nearly exponential 
growth of income of class 4 can be explained with the massive additional capacity installed form the year 2017 
onwards. 
  
Figure 3: Cumulative income of wind PPOs - 'FIT system run' (left) and the additional incomes in the 
'market premium run' (right). 
On the right side of Figure 3 one can see the additional incomes in the case of the ‘market premium run’ 
compared to the first run. Looking at the concrete values of the generated incomes at the end of the year 2019 in 
Table 9 offers the opportunity to estimate if the additional revenues from direct marketing are sufficient for 
further demand oriented investments. PPOs of class 1 receive supplementary earnings of about € 550m, class 2 
about € 870m, class 3 approximately € 780m and offshore PPOs almost € 350m. It has to be noted that this 
amount of money is only distributed among the plants which have decided in favour of direct marketing. 
Therefore, related to the produced electricity in direct marketing the specific additional revenues equal 
4.2 €/MWh (class 4) to 5.1 €/MWh (class 3). The differences results from the different tariffs, which are offered 
by the intermediaries. As the share of on-shore and off-shore capacity in direct marketing differs between the 
intermediaries the various bonuses paid result in different incomes for the PPOs. A more detailed analysis of the 
paid bonuses by the intermediaries is conducted in section ‘Impact on intermediaries’. 
Cumulative income [m €] Wind PPO 1 Wind PPO 2 Wind PPO 3 Wind PPO 4 
FIT system run 8,333.9 18,000.6 17,342.1 13,915.5 
Market premium run 8,889.7 18,870.8 18,123.5 14,262.7 
Table 9: Cumulative incomes of wind PPOs at the end of the year 2019. 
Figure 4 displays on the left side the cumulative incomes of the PV PPOs in the ’FIT-System run’. The wavelike 
structure of the curves clearly illustrates the increasing incomes in summertime and decreasing ones in 
wintertime. Compared to the income structure of the wind PPOs the curve progression between the different 
classes shows the same structure, resulting from the fact that the PV classes are mainly defined by the 
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technologies they represent. The installed capacity is always increasing and no switching of capacity between the 
classes takes place like in the case of wind energy. On the right side of Figure 4 the additional incomes due to 
direct marketing is shown. According to the installed capacity and its share in direct marketing classes 2 and 4 
are profiting the most. As no plant of class 1 is participating in direct marketing no additional incomes can be 
observed. 
  
Figure 4: Cumulative income of PV PPOs - 'FIT system run' (left) and the additional incomes in the 
'market premium run' (right). 
Table 10 shows the concrete values of the supplementary incomes of the different PV classes. PPOs of class 2 
are receiving additional earnings of almost € 300m, PPOs of class 3 are gaining € 15,000 and of class 4 nearly 
€ 125,000. Compared to the wind energy the supplementary payments turn out quite low – although the bonuses 
paid by the intermediaries are the same for wind and PV PPOs (see also Impact on intermediaries). The reason is 
that direct marketing of PV starts on a much lower level than wind (1 % in January 2012 compared to 40 % of 
wind) and that only 40 % of the overall installed capacity of PV is opting for direct marketing until 2015. The 
fact that the load factor of PV is also lower than the one of wind - thus resulting in lower amounts of produced 
electricity per MW - can be used as a further reason for the lower overall revenues as the bonuses are being paid 
per MWh. Based on the specific additional incomes of PV PPOs of more or less 4.8 €/MWh the direct marketing 
activity is as attractive as for wind. 
Cumulative income [m €] PV PPO 1 PV PPO 2 PV PPO 3 PV PPO 4 
FIT system run 33,351.9 23,566.0 793.8 7,025.9 
Market premium run 33,351.9 23,860.2 809.1 7,156.7 
Table 10: Cumulative incomes of PV PPOs at the End of year 2019. 
As long as the additional earnings by the wind and PV PPOs are not spend on equipment for a more demand 
oriented feed-in, the ‘market premium’ can clearly be viewed as evoking windfalls profits. Since especially the 
intermediaries are intrinsically motivated for direct marketing the electricity as good as possible, they will be the 
ones responsible for convincing the PPOs for taking the necessary actions. But to answer the question with 
AMIRIS if this will happen, will only be possible after further developments of the model. 
We conclude the analysis of the impact on the PPOs with a look on the biomass. Like in the case of PV the PPO 
classes are mainly defined by the technology they represent. The increase in revenues in the ‘FIT-System run’ 
develops more or less linearly until 2020 (see Figure 5). The only exception is class 2 displaying the deployment 
of innovative technologies like wood gasification, which is growing more than proportionally (see table 3). 
 
  
Figure 5: Cumulative income of biomass PPOs - 'FIT system run' (left) and the additional incomes in the 
'market premium run' (right). 
As displayed on the right side of Figure 5 and shown in Table 11 the additional incomes for the PPOs sum up to 
about € 410m in class 1, nearly € 450m in class 3 and a little more than € 50m in class 4. As no electricity from 
class 2 is directly marketed, no disparity in revenues can be witnessed. 
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Cumulative income [m €] Biomass PPO 1 Biomass PPO 2 Biomass PPO 3 Biomass PPO 4 
FIT system run 15,431.8 9,848.2 31,007.6 1,371.5 
Market premium run 15,864.2 9,848.2 31,552.8 1,423.5 
Table 11: Cumulative incomes of biomass PPOs at the end of year 2019. 
In order to clarify the impact on incomes 
through a more flexible operating mode 
of the capacity moving into direct 
marketing, we need to have a look at the 
development of the hourly income flows 
over time. This is shown exemplary for 
biogas power plants (class 3) in Figure 6. 
It can be clearly seen that due to the 
share of flexible capacity, the income 
flow is splitting in higher remunerations 
in daytime (upper graph) and lower 
payments in half-load operation during 
night time. This in turn leads to higher 
marketing values and thus higher 
incomes for the intermediaries. Whether 
this is passed on to the PPOs depends on 
the tariffs offered by the intermediaries.   
 
Impact on intermediaries 
By implementing ten different 
intermediary prototypes, we tried to 
embrace the quiet heterogeneous market 
structure of the direct marketing 
business.  
Figure 7 displays the development of the 
capital resources of the nine 
intermediary-agents, which use the 
market premium as support instrument. 
First of all it can be noted that no 
intermediary is going bankrupt, as all 
capital stocks are increasing until 2020. 
The stepped characteristic of the graphs 
results from the scheduling of the 
balance check. Only once, at the end of 
each year the intermediary sums up his 
expenses and payments. As a result of 
that the surpluses or losses of the year 
are accounted to the capital resources of the beginning of the year. Afterwards the new tariffs for the next year 
are calculated.  
However, the performance of the intermediaries is quite different. The most successful ones seem to be 
intermediary 2 and 10. This is due to the high shares of direct marketed capacity in their portfolio at the time of 
introduction of the market premium in January 2012 (see table 6). The advantage of being able to contract a lot 
of capacity from the beginning results from the early activities in the direct marketing business of these two 
intermediaries. 
More interesting is the question whether these two are able to defend their exclusive position in reality. As no 
direct competition is yet implemented and therefore no changes between the direct marketed capacities of the 
intermediaries take place, first estimations can be drawn from the offered tariffs. As one can see in Figure 8 all 
intermediaries except no. 3 and 6 are able to raise their tariffs after the year 2012. Intermediaries no. 1, 2, 4, 7, 9 
and 10 can even increase their bonus payments up to 7.5 €/MWh for intermittent and 2 €/MW for dispatchable 
RES before having to continually decrease their payments until 2015. At this point the management premium has 
been decreased to the lowest value of 7 €/MWh for intermittent and 2.25 €/MWh for dispatchable RES. 
Figure 6: Hourly income flows of biomass PPO of class 3 
including FIT and market premium. 
Figure 7: Development of capital resources of the intermediary-
agents from 2012 until 2020. 
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Figure 8: Bonuses paid by the nine intermediary-agents using the ‘market premium’ for intermittent and 
dispatchable RES from 2012-2020. 
The fact that obviously no intermediary offers a higher tariff than 7.5 €/MWh, which is also paid by intermediary 
2 and 10, can be carefully interpreted as hints leading to the conclusion that these two will be able to defend their 
competitive position. 
Comparing the absolute additional incomes from direct marketing via the market premium between the different 
PPOs and the intermediaries would lead to the conclusion that the supplementary incomes are situated in more or 
less the same range. Additional incomes for PPOs vary between € 15.000 for PV of class 3 and € 870m for wind 
of class 2; the diversity in incomes between the different intermediaries ranges from nearly € 20m (no. 6) to 
€ 600m (no. 10). But taking into consideration that the additional incomes for the PPOs classes are distributed 
among a much higher amount of individuals than in the case of intermediaries, the latter seem to profit even 
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more from the introduction of the ‘optional market premium’. But to conclude that this development is 
accompanied by windfall profits is risky. In general, windfall profits are the claim of financial incentives for a 
behaviour that would have been carried out even without additional payments. This is certainly not true in the 
case of direct marketing, as the services by the intermediaries of marketing the RES would not have taken place 
in this extent without the ‘optional market premium’. Undoubtedly, the height of the support can be questioned, 
as the intermediaries might have also been active with a lower premium. 
Last but not least attention has to be drawn to the fact that the overall financial situation of the intermediaries is 
heavily dependent on the balance energy payments. As no real-time markets are yet realised in the model, all 
intermediaries are hooked to the balance energy prices of the TSOs. Having in mind that these prices can neither 
be influenced by the intermediaries nor are they able to predict whether they will have to pay for imbalances or 
receive payments, the results of the runs need to be interpreted with caution. If the intermediary redounds to the 
imbalance of the TSO-area he has to 
pay balance energy fees (negative 
values in Figure 9), if he 
counterbalances to the imbalance of the 
TSO-area due to his forecast error he 
receives payments (positive values in 
Figure 9). Compared to the results from 
the actor analysis the balance energy 
payments of the intermediaries in the 
model seem to be reasonably lower 
than in reality. This becomes clear 
when having a look at the annually 
cumulative balance energy payments as 
shown in figure 9. Especially 
intermediary no. 10 seems to profit just 
by incident massively from received 
payments in millions. Therefore in the 
future the random seeds of the random 
generator, which are used for the capacity forecast error and the balance energy price need to be varied for all 
intermediaries in multiple simulation runs. The mean results of the various runs will then give a less random 
picture of the economic benefits or losses due to the required balance energy amounts.  
Conclusions and Outlook 
In a pilot project a first, yet simplified agent-based simulation model was developed focusing on the direct 
marketing of wind energy. After the successful demonstration of using the method of agent-based modelling for 
the analysis of different policy options, the model was expanded to other relevant actors for direct marketing of 
renewable electricity (photovoltaic and biomass/biogas plant operators). In addition, a merit-order model of the 
conventional generation system was implemented to calculate a model endogenic stock market price. 
The focus of the investigation is on the one hand on the opportunities of gaining additional revenues through the 
direct marketing supported by new regulation mechanisms like the ‘optional market premium’ (§ 33g  EEG). On 
the other hand, additional risks related to direct marketing, to which different actors with different capital 
backgrounds and energy portfolios are exposed to, are analysed under the paradigm of imperfect knowledge. 
First static simulation runs show that the introduction of the ‘market premium’ leads to diverse economic effects 
on the PPOs as well as on the intermediaries. Even if the macro-economic impact like the overall costs of the 
support mechanisms of different schemes might not be so diverse, the micro-economic impact on the different 
actors itself can be huge. 
Viewing market integration processes of renewables from an agent-based perspective allows for innovative 
computational analyses of the interdependencies between the relevant actors. It goes beyond standard market 
structure analysis by attempting to combine actor based and systemic considerations. With the agent-based 
simulation model AMIRIS influences of different market-designs on a macro as well as a micro scale can be 
analysed. These kinds of analyses are necessary to be able to construct sound support schemes in order to 
promote market development on the one hand but prevent windfall profits by certain actors on the other hand. 
Future work will concentrate on a more dynamic sampling of the agents and of the model itself. Up to now many 
parameters of the model and especially of the agents can change over time but are set external. Other aspects to 
be included deal with the analysis of different market designs for the time when high shares of renewables will 
be integrated into to the energy system. 
Figure 9: Annually cumulative balance energy payments of 
intermediary-agents between 2012-2020. 
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